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The Right of People (Misfits) to Refuse (Avoid)




For nearly a decade, the legal and medical professions have
tripped over one another in their earnest effort to rush a right to
treatment, either constitutional or statutory, to those they deter-
mine to be in need of help.2 The treatment generally is intended to
change a mental condition, state of mind or behavior deemed so-
cially unacceptable.
They have moved hastily, so hastily, in fact, that they have over-
looked or minimized:
1) The failure to identify the mental conditions of deviant be-
havior patterns as "diseases" or "syndromes" susceptible to treat-
ment of a medical or psychiatric nature. For example, is alcoholism
a disease? Homosexuality? Running away from home?
2) The inability to find a causal or even strongly correlative link
between conditions identified as diseases and behavior patterns or
states of mind to be altered. Is there a link between epilepsy and
aggression? If certain people are lobotomized will race riots be
stopped or curbed?
3) The absolute necessity of curtailing liberty to control condi-
tions deemed unacceptable to persons other than the individual
concerned, the-cure being inherent in the confinement or "treat-
ment." Heterosexual promiscuity is "cured" by separating persons
of the opposite sex from one another on psychiatric wards.
* Mr. Kaimowitz, a senior staff attorney for the federally-funded Michigan Legal Services
Assistance Program, petitioned a Michigan court to prevent the use of psychosurgery on
institutionalized persons. See Kaimowitz v. Michigan Department of Mental Health, 42
U.S.L.W. 2063 (July 31, 1973), discussed infra.
1. The material outside the parentheses in the title capsules the traditional view of the
problem presented by treatment of persons involuntarily committed to, or held against their
will in, public and private medical facilities. The material within the parentheses is intended
to convey the author's view of both the problem and the solution in terms the author believes
to be in keeping with the actual situation.
2. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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Anticipated physical assaults are prevented by placing people in
solitary confinement. Anger is gentled by massive doses of tranquil-
izers or crippling brain surgery.
4) The interrelationship of environmental, genetic, political,
economic, social, chemical, physical, biological and other factors in
producing the unacceptable conditions. Can a person's financial
poverty be a "symptom" of a "disease"? Can unemployment be
overcome by behavior modification? Is alcoholism eradicable by
medical care?'
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that people, mostly
persons labeled in one way or another as misfits, suffer legally and
medically when they are subjected to treatment they have not
requested, the benefit of which is dubious; they have a right to avoid
the so-called right to treatment and to be free of state intrusion into
their liberty and privacy, until it can be shown that their deeds are
anti-social to the extent necessary to warrant attention from the
criminal law process. Until such time, they should not have to relin-
quish their liberty to receive unrequested "treatment." 4
3. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 526 (1968), the Supreme Court declared:
It is one thing to say that if a man is deprived of alchohol his hands will begin to shake,
he will suffer agonizing pains and ultimately he will have hallucinations; it is quite
another to say that a man has a "compulsion" to take a drink, but that he also retains
a certain amount of "free will" with which to resist. It is simply impossible, in the
present state of our knowledge, to ascribe a useful meaning to the latter statement.
This definitional confusion reflects, of course, not merely the undeveloped state of the
psychiatric art but also the conceptual difficulties inevitably attendant upon the im-
portation of scientific and medical models into a legal system generally predicated
upon a different set of assumptions.
4. The D.C. Circuit in In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973), considered the state's
rationale for both confinement and treatment:
[Where the] individual poses no danger to society, society's interference must be
justified on the basis of the state's status as parens patriae. It is clearly recognized that
the state may act in this capacity and that relaxed procedures may be justified in
certain circumstances . . . and, indeed, it has been suggested that a duty to so act
may occasionally exist. . . .It was not until the mid or late nineteenth century that
therapy took its place beside detention in the American model. Of even more recent
vintage is the realization that substantial deprivation of constitutional rights justified
largely on behalf of the individual must be accompanied by a corresponding right to
treatment. . . . Without some form of treatment the state justification for acting as
parens patriae becomes a nullity. Yet even without considering the issue upon which
the parens patriae rationale must either stand or fall-whether meaningful treatment
is available, [citations omitted]-we note several problems in the current statute
which seem to undercut the apparent justification. Consider the individual who is
untreatable in the present state of medical science. Perhaps all that can be done for
him under institutional tutelage is to care for his physical needs and/or subdue him
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One virtue of the criminal process is, at least, that duration of
penal incarceration typically has some outside statutory limit;
this is universally true in the case of petty offenses, such as
public drunkenness, where jail terms are quite short on the
whole. "Therapeutic civil commitment" lacks this feature; one
is typically committed until one is "cured." Thus, to do other-
wise than affirm might subject indigent alcoholics to the risk
that they may be locked up for an indefinite period of time
under the same conditions as before, with no more hope than
before of receiving effective treatment and no prospect of peri-
odic "freedom." 5
While the helping professions have argued among themselves
about everything from identification of "illnesses" to the reality of
the "cures," they have held the misfits who are the objects of atten-
tion under control, primarily through institutionalization and medi-
cation. Thus they have made complex a proposition historically
regarded as simple under the concepts of the United States Consti-
tution-that no one can be deprived of liberty by the state unless
provably dangerous to the persons or property of others, or subject
to a required presence by the state, e.g., the army. Unfortunately,
now it is seen as necessary to discuss at the highest judicial levels
whether persons can be so deprived of liberty for their own good, to
receive the benefits of an amorphous right to treatment.'
Until the 1960's, the state was relatively free to shuffle around the
helpless, the misfits, the oppressed, from one authority to another,
and from one institution to another. With the coming of the civil
rights movement, oppressed sectors of our society (racial minorities,
the poor, women) began to successfully assert themselves through
civil disobedience, and the courts listened. Advocates for the civil
rights suits of the 60's soon became accustomed to speaking for such
oppressed persons, and it was only a logical step to assume the same
posture toward prisoners, mental patients, and institutionalized
through use of drugs. Unless the right to treatment be interpreted to include ineffective
treatment, an anomaly in itself, the parens patriae rationale would seemingly fail and
indeterminate institutionalization would necessarily be a purely custodial function
and justifiable only by other considerations.
The author agrees in substance with the problems raised by this analysis, but not with their
solutions, since release, rather than "effective" right to treatment, in most instances, is the
author's suggested "cure."
5. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 529 (1968).
6. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
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children-those unable to reach neither the streets nor the courts.
These misfits, deemed unable to speak for themselves, were made
to appear incompetent due to physical, mental, emotional or envi-
ronmental handicaps. Unfortunately, not only did the authority fig-
ures accept the labels placed on institutionalized persons, but their
advocates did as well.7 Instead of concentrating on the abuses and
stigma these individuals suffered as a result of the various labels
and institutional placements, the treatment advocates sought to
help the misfits who were presumed unable to help themselves.
As a result, one offshoot of the advocacy of the civil rights move-
ment was a judicially created right to treatment. Unfortunately,
however, civil rights advocates who readily understood what was
wrong with treating "niggers like children" cannot now see what is
wrong with treating "children like niggers." Had age, mental state,
or institutional status been marked in a moral, if not legal sense,
as a "badge of slavery," just as race is, treatment advocates would
have championed the position of children or institutionalized per-
sons as they had that of the blacks. They would have argued that
the institutionalized can only be helped by fundamental societal
change, rather than by the attempted adjustment of these individu-
als to an expected norm. Had treatment advocates looked more
closely, they would have discerned that society plagues the "misfit"
in many of the same ways and for many of the same rea-
sons-dissent and deviancy-that it oppresses blacks and women.'
7. See CLASSIFICATION OF EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN (N. Hobbs ed, 1974); N. HOBBS, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN (1975) (multi-volume study about the classification and labeling of
children). See also Braginsky & Braginsky, The Mentally Retarded: Society's Hansels and
Gretals, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Mar., 1974, at 18; Braginsky & Braginsky, Psychologists: High
Priests of the Middle Class, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Dec., 1973, at 142, where the authors assert
their belief that the entire social system classification of human beings is designed to favor
the professionals over the lower socio-economic strata of society:
(T)he entire system within which psychologists and psychiatrists operate is sociopoliti-
cal. The entire system of psychological classification, and labelling, and diagnosis is
faulty .. .unreliable, but so are the general distinctions between the mad and the
sane, the stupid and the smart.
Id. at 142.
8. See, e.g., the change in position of Marian Wright Edleman, from the time when, as
the only black woman attorney in Mississippi, she sought the integration of Jackson, Miss.
schools in 1964, to her present posture vis-d-vis children as expressed in Drive for the Rights
of Children, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 5, 1974, at 42. Cf. J. FARBER, THE STUDENT AS
NIGGER (Pocket Book ed. 1972).
9. See P. CHESLER, WOMEN AND MADNESS (1972); Mason, Brain Surgery to Control
Behavior, EBONY, Feb., 1973, at 63; cf. Roth, Dayley & Lerner, Into the Abyss: Psychiatric
Vol. 13: 863
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II. JUDICIAL RIGHT TO TREATMENT
In less than a decade, the right to treatment concept has taken
such a firm foothold in several lower courts that many judges now
speak comfortably of such a right-as if it had always existed. As
early as 1966, Judge David Bazelon declared that civil commitment
without treatment would raise considerable constitutional problems
under the due process, equal protection, and cruel and unusual
punishment clauses of the Constitution.'0 Although the courts have
recognized that commitment involves a "massive curtailment of
liberty," even when done for a worthy purpose, they have rational-
ized this curtailment through a judically created right to treat-
ment."
The United States Supreme Court has been somewhat more cau-
tious than the lower courts in their zest to supplant liberty with
"treatment." Incarceration is to be limited for the most part to
punishment and confinement for acts considered dangerous and
offensive to society. In Powell v. Texas,'2 by the narrowest margin,
the Court stood opposed to the labeling of closed institutions as
"hospitals" simply to justify the long-term incarceration of individ-
uals labeled "alcoholics." But more recently in Wolff v.
McDonnell,'3 the Supreme Court showed itself susceptible to allow-
ing "treatment" and "corrections" to erode substantive and proce-
Reliability and Emergency Commitment Statutes, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 400, 410 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Roth].
In 1899, Michigan barred women from being public prosecutors over a biting dissent com-
plaining that women thereby were being treated as incompetents, akin to children, idiots and
lunatics. Attorney General v. Abbott, 121 Mich. 540, 80 N.W. 372 (1899). In 1973, a Michigan
woman was barred from seeking office on a local board of education, because she was only 15
years old. Human Rights Party v. Secretary of State for Michigan, 370 F. Supp. 921 (E.D.
Mich. 1973), aff'd, 414 U.S. 1058 (1973). In its brief to the United States Supreme Court, the
Michigan Attorney General, in support of his motion to dismiss or affirm the Human Rights
Party case, relied on Abbott to justify keeping the young woman off the ballot.
10. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). Judge David Bazelon, a pioneer in
the bridging of psychiatry and the law, apparently has become increasingly disillusioned
about the contribution of psychiatry to the rendering of legal decisions. See Bazelon,
Psychiatry and the Adversary Process, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, June, 1974, at 8.
11. See O'Conner v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); New York State Ass'n for Retarded
Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752 (E.D. N.Y. 1973); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.
Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974);
Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d 908
(1968); Silvers v. People, 22 Mich. App. 1, 176 N.W.2d 702 (1970).
12. 392 U.S. 514 (1968). See note 3 supra.
13. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
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dural due process when it considered the rights of prisoners facing
disciplinary hearings. The Court opted for "swift and sure . . . dis-
cipline" of prisoners alleged to be malcontents, grounding its deci-
sion on principles of behavior modification (B.F. Skinner) to justify
denying full procedural due process to those who "would merely
disrupt and exploit the disciplinary process for their own ends."14
Clearly, the court did this for "the good of" the disrupters and
disturbed inmates, as well as for the institution. 5 Justice Douglas
in his dissent saw the obvious tenor as well as implications of the
Court's position. Such a position is tenable only if incarcerated
individuals are declared "nonpersons" not entitled to specific con-
stitutional safeguards, but who remain eligible for some benefic-
ence and sympathy from the rest of us.
Every prisoner's liberty is, of course, circumscribed by the very
fact of his confinement, but his interest in the limited liberty
left to him is then only the more substantial. Conviction of a
crime does not render one a nonperson whose rights are subject
to the whim of the prison administration, and therefore the
imposition of any serious punishment within the prison system
requires procedural safeguards."6
This article hypothesizes that the fostering of a concept of a legal
right to treatment endangers the personality, integrity, and human-
ity of every individual who by status or condition finds herself1
rendered helpless and completely open to the whim of authority, be
it benign or malignant. Before the coming of a "right to treat-
ment,"'" institutionalized persons should have or could have been
protected by the enunciated -and established freedom from state
action and intrusion, particularly the first, fifth and fourteenth
amendments. At law, as "persons," their allies should have been
attorneys, not social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists and edu-
cators. Now, instead, they are to be protected from themselves by
attorneys acting in concert with the so-called "helping" profes-
sionals. The impetus in this direction came from the 1967 Supreme
14. Id. at 563.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 594 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
17. The author intends to use the feminine throughout this article when referring to
woman or man generically.
18. See Goodman, The Constitution v. the Snakepit, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1974, § 6
(Magazine), at 20 for an analysis of treatment advocates in the mental health field.
Vol. 13: 863
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Court momentous leap forward to expand constitutional rights to
juveniles. In re Gault'9 recognized that children were persons under
the law and that the Constitution was for their benefit and protec-
tion as well as for their adult counterparts. Had the "treatment
movement" then marshalled itself behind the fundamental con-
cept that all persons in this country are entitled to the same consti-
tutional rights and liabilities-no less and no more-the walls to
many closed institutions would have come down. Instead, the
walls have been strengthened, with the aid of treatment advocates,
to perpetuate the confinement of misfits and deviants, persons
believed to require something other than constitutional protec-
tion."0 The anomaly created by the courts and treatment advocates
should be obvious-the people believed to be in need of the most
protection are to receive the least constitutional benefit.
III. CASE ANALYSIS
The remaining sections of this article will evaluate and consider
several lower court opinions which have seen the clearcut connec-
tion between the Supreme Court's view expressed in Gault and the
status of persons involuntarily detained in total institutions. The
discussion to follow will be limited to those persons in total institu-
tions where an "inherently coercive atmosphere" is found to thor-
oughly restrict one's potential for choice.2 In such total institutions,
19. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
20. Since the advocates themselves had trouble viewing misfits as people, it is not surpris-
ing that the Supreme Court soon veered from Gault's promise in the more recent case of
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). In McKeiver, the Court denied children a
constitutional right to a jury trial in situations where one would have been afforded to adults.
Children were not given their full panoply of rights in large measure because even their
advocates did not consider them people at law-they should have had more assurance of
constitutional protection rather than less.
21. There are, however, a few lower court decisions which have recognized the obvious
connection between the Court's early position in Gault and the status of institutionalized
persons confined for mental deficiences. See Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968)
and Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. & W.D. Mich. 1974). In these
cases, the former concerning a juvenile mental defective, the latter two women alleged to be
mentally ill, lower federal courts readily applied Gault to situations which concerned confine-
ment for treatment rather than rehabilitation for waywardness. See also E. GOFFMAN,
ASYLUMS (1961) for a comprehensive study of total institutions. In a Letter Opinion, Michigan
Attorney General, Feb. 19, 1974, written in response to a lawsuit filed to halt medical research
and experimentation on institutionalized children, Jobes v. Department of Mental Health,
Civil No. 74-004-130-DC (Cir. Ct. Wayne Co., Mich., filed Jan. 19, 1974) the Attorney Gene-
1975
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confined individuals are never free from the state's authority, unlike
the school child playing in the field or the soldier home on leave.
They are under perpetual state control even if temporarily released
to a halfway house, or placed on probation or parole, for they can
generally be returned to the institution at the whim of public au-
thority, and therefore, must constantly bend to avoid displeasing
those in charge."
A. Stowers v. Wolodzko23
In Stowers v. Wolodzko, a woman was placed under court order
in a private mental health facility in Michigan after psychiatrists
had her committed at the request of her husband. She was unwill-
ingly transported to the hospital and forcibly injected with medica-
tion. The defendant-physician argued that his treatment of the
plaintiff was required regardless of her failure to consent because of
the contract he had made with the plaintiff's husband to provide
medical care. 4 Although the court proceeded to focus the
issue-whether a patient, once admitted to the hospital pursuant to
(law), may be given treatment by the doctor without the patient's
consent?-it never resolved the question. Instead the court avoided
the issue by relying on a Michigan statutory provision which permit-
ted treatment at state mental health facilities, prior to an adjudica-
tion of mental illness, but which permitted only detention, and not
treatment, at private hospitals. Since Mrs. Stowers had been con-
fined in a private hospital she received $40,000 in damages, but the
state mental health facilities remained unaffected by the court's
opinion .25
ral confessed "that persons confined to institutions, particularly children, may not be able
to give truly voluntary consent in such matters."
22. The author has corresponded with the State Department of Mental Health in Michi-
gan to object to the summary return of retardates from halfway houses to institutions. I have
met with the response that the Department does not have sufficient funds to conduct hearings
before the transfers are made, a position discounted by the United States Supreme Court in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
23. 386 Mich. 119, 191 N.W.2d 355 (1971).
24. Id. at 128-29, 191 N.W.2d at 359.
25. The court relied on MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.811 (1969), repealed by Act of Aug. 6, 1974,
Pub. Act No. 258, § 718. The Michigan Department of Mental Health specifically has defied
the position of the state Attorney General in the past. The Director of the Department of
Mental Health took the position that to prevent treatment of involuntarily committed per-
sons until they finally were adjudged mentally ill would make hospitals little more than jails
or prisons, and he could not assent to their use merely as detention centers, so he was
Vol. 13: 863
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The Stowers court did, however, specifically refer with approval
to an earlier Attorney General's opinion"s which stated that all su-
perintendents of hospitals, private or state, might be liable for as-
sault or trespass for any treatment administered to persons prior to
a final adjudication of mental illness "without the consent of the
patient, other than that necessary to keep him on the premises and
to prevent his injuring himself or others .... ",27
B. Winters v. Miller28
Although Stowers recognized the issue and raised the right ques-
tion, it remained unanswered by the Michigan court. In contrast, a
recent Second Circuit opinion produced the right answer but by
asking the wrong question. In Winters v. Miller, the Second Circuit
in a divided opinion reversed the dismissal of a complaint for dam-
ages brought by a Christian Scientist who complained of being sub-
jected to forced medication in violation of her first amendment
rights. The court determined that the primary question was whether
the appellant's constitutional rights under the free exercise clause
were being violated when psychiatric medication was administered
to her over her objections, which were religious in nature. 9 The
religious issue then was employed by the Second Circuit to compel
the defendant public authorities to bear a greater burden to justify
the imposition of treatment, and the court found that the state had
failed to meet its burden:
[TIhere is no evidence in the record that would indicate that
in forcing the unwanted medication on Miss Winters the state
was in any way protecting the interest of society or even any
third party.30
This statement by the court indicates that the state may not rely
on the doctrine of parens patriae to justify the treatment it imposed
on Miss Winters, because it had never found her incompetent, nor
informing superintendents that they could continue treatment. Letter of Dr. E. G. Udashkin
to the Michigan Attorney General, Mar. 8, 1973. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
26. 2 Op. Arr'y GEN. 1955-56, No. 2847, at 693 (1956), cited in Stowers v. Wolodzko, 386
Mich. 119, 132, 191 N.W.2d 355, 362 (1971).
27. Id.
28. 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1971).
29. Id. at 68.
30. Id. at 70.
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given her the judicial opportunity to prove she was not mentally ill.
The Second Circuit majority in effect reiterated the right to refuse
treatment based on religious grounds which had been articulated
earlier by the Illinois Supreme Court in In re Brooks' Estate.3' Both
courts saw the matter in light of a refusal of treatment by a person
with certain religious convictions and a prior history of practice in
that religion. But clearly the burden was on the individual to prove
both the religious conviction and its depth in order to avoid forced
treatment. The reasoning employed in Winters leaves the disquiet-
ing impression that any person without religious convictions in op-
position to medication, and certainly anyone adjudged legally in-
competent, must tolerate and accept the treatment as administered
by the institution. Fortunately, other courts have recently come to
a different conclusion, at least in part.
C. Bell v. Wayne County General Hospital32
The psychiatric profession and related fields have long accepted
the "necessity" of subjecting some persons to treatment against
their will largely on the basis that these su'bjects are too disturbed
to know what is good for them, and are therefore incapable of con-
senting to treatment even if they desire it." The Bell/Dalimonte
decision cut right into the heart of that premise. These consolidated
cases were aimed in support of a right to refuse all treatments which
physically intrude on the person of the patient, as well as the right
31. 32 Ill. App. 2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).
32. 384 F. Supp. 1085 (E.D. & W.D. Mich. 1974).
33. Refusal to "volunteer" for hospitalization, i.e., requiring the state to hold one against
one's will, perhaps constitutes the strongest statement a person can make against unwanted
treatment. More than 4,000 of the 10,000 people held in Michigan in 1973, were held involun-
tarily, LINK, July 11, 1974 (a Michigan State Department of Mental Health Bulletin). Of
the remaining 6,000, many undoubtedly were minors who had been "volunteered" for treat-
ment by parents or guardians, and therefore ought to be regarded as persons involuntarily
detained since they are deemed incapable of giving consent to their own hospitalization.
Psychiatrists apparently are not adverse to treating people against their will, be they adults
or children. A survey of one out of every six psychiatrists in the United States was undertaken
by Roche Laboratories in 1973; it demonstrated that the profession as a whole does not object
to coerced treatment, including forced hospitalization. Some 88% of those surveyed favored
involuntary hospitalization; 70% favored further research in psychosurgical techniques and
enforced use of psychiatric techniques for prisoners with antisocial personality disorders.
Interestingly, the psychiatrists showed their "humanity" by standing 75% square with the
establishment of a legal "right to treatment." Szasz, Psychiatry: A Clear and Present Danger,
58 MENTAL HYGIENE 17, 19 (Spring 1974).
Vol. 13: 863
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to refuse hospitalization. 4 The therapies considered by the Bell
decision were two commonly accepted modes of treatment-
electroshock therapy and chemotherapy. Electroshock therapy is
apparently easier for the medical profession to relinquish as a tool
to "treat" or "control" persons alleged to be mentally ill, than is
chemotherapy. Since electroshock therapy frequently results in
serious negative side effects which can be easily linked to the ther-
apy, physicians are less inclined to employ it without fully inform-
ing the patient of its risks and benefits.
A common injury of the psychiatric patient is fracture of a
vertebra in electric shock treatment. The fact that such injury
occurs in as many as 30 percent of the cases makes it manda-
tory that the psychiatrist apprise the patient of the danger. 5
A far more wide-spread and insidious form of treatment is chem-
otherapy, upon which the psychiatric profession relies so heavily. 8
Chemotherapy, is equally objectionable as electroshock therapy,
but for different reasons. First, the state of the science is so imma-
ture that the effectiveness of this procedure is doubtful at best and
negative at worst. In a recent study by a group of west coast psychol-
ogists it was found that drug therapy frequently causes many more
34. The action was directed at the procedures and standards for determining which indi-
viduals are to be subjected to institutionalization as allegedly mentally ill persons. Neither
emergency commitment of those shown to be homicidally dangerous to public safety, nor
permanent commitment of those found to be mentally ill after full hearing, was challenged
in Bell. The target was the provision permitting temporary commitment of nondangerous, as
well as of dangerous persons, in the belief that most of the people involuntarily held in state
mental health facilities are treated as temporary commitments under the since-repealed
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.811 (1969) repealed by Act of Aug. 6, 1974, Pub. Act No. 258, § 718.
The Bell case, like Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), now provides
safeguards to permit mental patients the opportunity to protest against their being confined
in mental hospitals, without fear that they will lose their constitutional rights in the process.
35. Feld, Mental Health and the Law: The Psychiatrist's Liability for Malpractice, Men-
tal Health Digest, reprint from 3 NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR MENTAL HEALTH INFORMATION
59 (Sept. 1971).
36. See Morris & Luby, Civil Commitment in a Suburban County: An Investigation by
Law Students, 13 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 518 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Morris & Luby]. For
a more extensive discussion of the legal issues concerning different forms of therapies see
Note, Conditioning and Other Technologies Used to "Treat?" "Rehabilitate?" "Demolish?"
Prisoners and Mental Patients, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 616 (1972). In a study in one Michigan
county it was found that electroshock therapy was used as treatment in only 4% of the cases,
while chemotherapy was employed in 50% of the cases. Morris & Luby, supra at 527. In nearly
40% of the other cases studied, no data were available on the form of treatment but it could
be presumed that in many of those instances chemotherapy was employed.
1975
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problems than it solves. Second, no two patients appear to react
alike to a particular psychotropic drug.
The hope that subtypes of schizophrenics might be defined on
the basis of their specific response to drugs seems rather re-
mote, at least if one considers responses among various types
of phenothiazines. Until we know more about the fate of these
drugs in the body, and what this may mean in regard to clinical
outcome, clinicians must continue to use these drugs largely on
an empirical basis. 7
Finally, it is left to one of the leading advocates of psychosurgery
to make the strongest case against the use of chemotherapy, espe-
cially when it is applied contrary to the desires of the patient. Dr.
Vernon H. Mark has this to say about chemotherapy:
Although a single dose of any antipsychotic drug is seldom
dangerous, the administration of these agents over a period of
weeks or months may cause a number of side effects and com-
plications. A syndrome resembling Parkinson's disease is com-
mon and some of the drugs may occasionally produce a fatal
leukopenia.18
Indeed, it would seem that a person would have to be "crazy" to pay
the price described by Dr. Mark for prolonged chemotherapy.
What the Michigan court did in Bell was recognize that at least
until proven mentally ill, a patient ought to have the right to avoid
such treatment and untoward side effects if she wishes to do so.
Both petitioners, Annette Bell and Gloria Dalimonte, had been hos-
pitalized on numerous occasions; neither had ever been finally adju-
37. Hollister, Specific Indications for Different Classes of Phenothiazines, 30 ARCH. GEN.
PSYCHIAT. 94 (1974).
38. Mark, Psychosurgery v. Anti-Psychiatry, 54 B.U.L. REV. 217, 226 (1974), Dr. Mark
then went on to quote a Special Report of an FDA Task Force which found:
Because of the lack of adequate substitutes for the neuroleptic drugs in the treatment
of psychosis, tardive dyskinesia has been accepted as an undesirable but occasionally
unavoidable price to be paid for the benefits of prolonged neuroleptic therapy.
Id. at 226, quoting American College of Neuropsychopharmacology-FDA Task Force Report,
Neurological Syndromes Associated with Antipsychotic Drug Use: A Special Report, 28
ARCH. OF GEN. PSYCHIAT. 463, 465 (1973).
39. In Joseph Heller's novel, Catch 22, combat pilots who say they are too crazy to fly
are judged sane and sent aloft again, because they rationally have reasoned that a person has
to be insane to fly combat missions. Of course, if the individual does not complain, he
continues to fly combat missions-either way the pilots continue to fly. Undoubtedly, Catch
23 is the situation described in the text.
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dicated mentally ill, and both had been subjected to intrusive medi-
cal therapies against their will, Bell to chemotherapy and Dali-
monte to electroshock therapy. Although the Bell court recognized
that Michigan law permits involuntary treatment in state hospitals
during pre-hearing detention and temporary commitment, it real-
ized the danger of leaving definitions of "treatment" open to the
whim of medical imagination:
The term "treatment" is undefined in the act, thus its scope
is potentially unlimited.' ***Until a recent Michigan state
court decision psychosurgery, the most grotesquely intrusive
form of treatment, was considered within its purview. Kaimo-
witz v. State Department of Mental Health 42 L.W. 2063
(July 31, 1973). 40
The Bell court placed in focus, without citation to precedent, the
basis for an individual's right to refuse involuntary treatment. The
Court found that on its face the Michigan statute4' clearly implied
that one temporarily committed could be forcibly subjected to phys-
ically intrusive methods of treatment extending to electroshock
therapy as well as chemotherapy. Since the language of the statute
expressly prohibited coercive treatment for emergency detentions,
but ignored other forms of commitment, the court reasoned that this
obvious silence as to temporary commitments was an effective en-
dorsement of coercive therapies for such commitments. In this im-
plication the court found:
[a] sufficient basis to declare the pre-hearing detention and
temporary commitment provisions of M.C.L.A. § 330.21 viola-
tive of the constitutional right to privacy and due process of law
insofar as they permit involuntary treatment of a physically
intrusive nature.42
Unfortunately for the rights of persons subjected to involuntary
commitment in Michigan, the state legislature did not receive the
constitutional message of the Bell court. The new mental health
code, passed without opposition in both houses, permits involuntary
treatment in the form of chemotherapy after a preliminary hearing
to determine whether there is probable cause to believe a person is
40. 384 F. Supp. at 1100 & n.20.
41. MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 14,811 (1969), repealed by Act of Aug. 6, 1974, Pub. Act No. 258,
§ 718.
42. Bell v. Wayne County Gen. Hosp., 384 F. Supp. 1085, 1100 (W.D. & E.D. Mich. 1974).
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mentally ill and in need of treatment under the act.43 Such "treat-
ment" is permitted before a full adjudication to determine whether
a person is in fact subject to involuntary commitment." The Michi-
gan legislature made no attempt to conform to the constitutional
interpretation made by the Bell court.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Perhaps the greatest need for people figuratively or literally be-
hind a wall is to feel they are in touch with a real world, an outside
world, a world trying to understand. That was and is the one valid
offering an "outsider" can make to an oppressed person, a white to
a black, a man to a woman, an adult to a child. Surely it is more
difficult for the institutionalized to share that feeling as long as they
are under observation 24 hours a day by the very authorities who
are hauled into court for oppressing them. But they need not be
additionally betrayed by advocates who won't help tear down the
walls, but instead only promise to make them prettier.
The walls can come tumbling down, as did some of the walls of
segregation after the United States Supreme Court recognized that
black children were being denied equal educational opportunity as
long as a state could hide behind the legal fiction that blacks were
getting separate but equal treatment. 5 From that time on, attorneys
especially shared in the pleasure of tearing down needless legal bar-
riers which stood in the way of blacks, women, poor, Indians, and
Latinos. It is hardly surprising, then, that almost all of the cases
cited and discussed herein, concerning the kind of care and treat-
ment people are afforded behind real walls and fences, burgeoned
some time after the start of the movement to clear needless figura-
tive fences between neighbors.
At the start of that movement to tear down the barriers between
various classifications and groupings of people-when Rosa Parks
43. Act of Aug. 6, 1974, Pub. Act No. 258, § 718(1) which reads:
Chemotherapy shall not be administered to an individual who has been hospitalized
by medical certification or by petition pursuant to chapter 4 or 5 until after the
preliminary court hearing has been held unless the individual consents to such chem-
otherapy or unless the administration of such chemotherapy is necessary to prevent
physical injury to the individual or others.
44. Id.
45. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), rev'd by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S.
483 (1954).
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refused to go to the back of that bus in Montgomery, Alabama-the
direction clearly was toward rights, and away from parens patriaeprotection such as that afforded to blacks in the South. No one
advocating for them doubted that the black children in Brown v.
Board of Education46 were entitled to rights, not protections.
But by the 1967 Gault decision, the United States Supreme Court
was becoming worried that children as such were not getting enough
protection. Some lower courts and the Supreme Court itself in Kent
v. United States47 showed concern earlier, but did not fully articu-
late their position. In Gault, however, the Supreme Court, under the
guise of granting rights to children, actually limited them by consid-
ering children as "persons" only for some purposes under the um-
brella of the United States Constitution. Instead, children were to
be promised better protection than they had received before. By the
time the United States Supreme Court decided that children were
not constitutionally entitled to a jury trial when they faced incarcer-
ation,49 the legal path to be taken for this group of misfits was made
clear-more protection, rather than more rights.
The treatment advocates accommodated. Instead of the rights
they sought for blacks or women or poor people, whose representa-
tive organizations never would have stood for more protection, they
traded the "liberty" of their new clients for a "right" to "treat-
ment," manufactured out of whole cloth, albeit not constitutional
material. The advocates did not have to see, hear or speak the evil;
as a matter of fact, because of the difficulty of access, they often did
not have to see, hear or speak to their clients either.
This article has suggested that it may be more important in the
long run for people behind walls-the lame, the halt, the blind, the
too young and the too old, the defective and the deviant-to come
fully under the Constitution and be recognized as persons for all
purposes in courts of law-at least legally unstigmatized by such
labels as "infants" and "incompetents."5 It has recommended that
the newly discovered "oppressed" people, by refusing treatment,
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
48. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
50. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c) which treats incompetents and infants alike, and
requires them to appear in court by next of friend or guardian, vesting full power, including
the selection of counsel, in the individual guardian and in the court. But see Buckholz v.
Leveille, 37 Mich. App. 166, 194 N.W.2d 427 (1971).
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could trigger access into courts without having their position under-
mined by guardians, parents or agencies ostensibly present to assist
them.
If they are accorded the full benefit of the Constitution, they will
not need the "right to treatment," nor "privilege" as it should more
properly be denoted. Instead, like all other people they will have the
liberty guaranteed to them by the Constitution, perhaps to use in
ways that are no more pleasing to their advocates than to their
overseers, but theirs to use nonetheless.
In effect, it is recommended that the institutionalized refuse the
handout called "treatment" granted to them under, what is for
them already, a therapeutic state, and strive legally to get that to
which they are entitled by and under law. Their "health" will be
weighed and measured by society-to the extent that they are able
to establish their entitlement to rights long ago accorded to the rest
of us, e.g., to be free from state intrusion into their minds and
bodies, to be free from cruel and unusual punishment even when it
is disguised as treatment, to be free from assault, battery and false
imprisonment.
Misfits must be recognized as persons and given full access to
courts to have their claims heard. And only when the law is fully
willing to hear what they express as being good for them, instead of
what others-state or parent, authority or advocate-say must be
provided, will the fourteenth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution come to fruition for all people in this nation-those who
fit, as well as those who don't.
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